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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF AWARDS SET ASIDE 
AT THE SEAT: AN ASIAN AND EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
Rashda Rana SC* 
The enforcement of awards following a decision at the seat 
remains a controversial issue in international arbitration. Should an 
enforcement court follow the decision of the seat court, or can the 
enforcement court reach a different conclusion? US, English, and 
French courts continue to take different approaches to this issue. The 
position may not be so different in Asian courts. 
While, at first blush, it may be thought that an award which has 
been set aside by a supervisory court cannot be enforced in any other 
jurisdiction, there is an emerging body of cases which suggests 
otherwise. The emerging case law does not give the seat the pre-
eminent prominence in the determination of the validity of the award 
as one would think it deserves. French courts disregard the decisions 
of seat courts altogether. In a series of cases, French courts have 
enforced awards that have been set aside or suspended at the seat of 
arbitration. The French courts have provided two justifications for 
their approach: 
1. French domestic law does not recognize the setting aside or 
suspension of the award as a ground for refusing enforcement. 
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2. French courts consider that an international arbitral award is 
not “anchored” or “integrated” in the seat of arbitration. 
Therefore, the views of seat courts on the validity of the award 
simply have no bearing on whether the award should be enforced 
in France. 
Some commentators favor the French approach. In Gaillard’s view, 
international arbitration is a transnational legal order in which no state 
should have the final say on the validity of the award. Accordingly, 
each enforcement court should be entitled to form its own view on the 
validity of the award, regardless of what the courts at the seat of 
arbitration may think. 
As Emmanuel Gaillard has observed: 
The idea that the New York Convention would place the seat of 
the arbitration at the top of a jurisdictional hierarchy for 
enforcement purposes is counter to its fundamental objectives. If 
accepted, it would shift the focus from the award itself, which is 
the subject matter of the Convention, to the judicial process 
surrounding the award in the country where it was rendered, and 
would fly in the face of one of the greatest achievements of the 
New York Convention. Indeed, one must recall that the drafters 
of the Convention set out to abolish the requirement of double 
exequatur, which governed enforcement under the 1927 Geneva 
Convention on the Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards.1 
In Société Hilmarton v. Société O.T.V,2 the French court had to 
consider whether to recognize an award that had been set aside in its 
country of origin, Switzerland. The Cour de Cassation held that the 
award in question was, “an international award which was not 
integrated into the Swiss . . . legal order, such that its existence 
continued in spite of its being set aside.”3 The decision in Hilmarton 
was explained by the Cour de Cassation in Société PT Putrabali 
Adyamulia c/ SA Rena Holdings4: the impact of a national court’s 
decision to annul an award is confined to its own jurisdiction and that 
the enforcement court decides whether to enforce based on its own 
rules. In other words, the French approach is that the French courts 
                                                                                                                                     
1. Emmanuel Gaillard, International Arbitration as a Transnational System of Justice, in 
ARBITRATION—THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS 71 (ICCA Congress Series No. 16, 2012) (emphasis 
added). 
2. The Cour de Cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, 23 March 1994, Rev. Arb. 327. 
3. Id. 
4. 1ère civ., 29 June 2007. 
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may still enforce an award which has been set aside by the 
supervisory court. 
A recent case dealt with this very issue. In Yukos Capital S.a.r.L 
v. OJSC Oil Company Rosneft,5 the English High Court was required 
to consider whether to recognize a decision of a foreign court setting 
aside an award and to take into account whether the decision in 
question was obtained by fraud and to apply principles of natural 
justice and English public policy. In September 2006, Yukos Capital 
obtained four arbitral awards (“Awards”) against a former Yukos 
entity taken over by a Russian state-owned Rosneft and began 
enforcement proceedings in the Dutch courts. The arbitration was 
seated in Russia. Although the Russian Arbitrazh Courts had 
subsequently set aside all of the Awards (“Russian Set-aside 
Decisions”), the Dutch courts allowed Yukos Capital to enforce the 
Awards, holding that the Russian courts had acted without 
impartiality and independence. However, no payment was 
forthcoming. 
Yukos Capital then brought a second enforcement action in 
England. It argued that, in light of the Dutch court’s judgment, 
Rosneft could no longer rely on the Russian Set-aside Decisions to 
annul the Awards. Rosneft argued, to the contrary, that the doctrine of 
Act of State prohibited the English courts from questioning the 
Russian Set-aside Decisions. The English Court of Appeal did not 
agree with either proposition. It did not consider the Russian Set-aside 
Decisions to be an Act of State, and Rosneft was not estopped from 
relying on them. 
The principal sums due under the Awards were eventually paid 
by Rosneft but, as the Awards did not contain provisions for the 
payment of interest, no interest was paid in respect of the delay in 
payment. Accordingly, Yukos Capital continued its claim in the 
English High Court for post-award interest. The claims for interest 
were advanced under Article 395 of the Russian Civil Code and/or 
Section 35 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (“1981 Act”). 
The English High Court was concerned with two preliminary 
questions: 
1. Whether the Russian Set-aside Decisions meant that the 
Awards could not be enforced because they no longer existed in a 
legal sense (“Enforcement Preliminary Issue”); and 
                                                                                                                                     
5. [2014] EWHC 2188 (Comm). 
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2. Whether, in principle, interest could be recovered in respect of 
such awards under Russian law and/or English law (“Interest 
Preliminary Issue”). 
On the Enforcement Preliminary Issue, Rosneft argued that the 
Awards were made under and existed subject to Russian law. Since 
the Awards had been annulled by the Russian courts in the Russian 
Set-aside Decisions, they no longer existed and consequently there 
was no obligation under Russian law to comply with them. 
Accordingly, Rosneft contended that under the principle ex nihilo nil 
fit,6 there were no legal grounds on which Yukos Capital could bring 
an action in the English court. 
Yukos Capital argued that an award could be enforced provided 
that it was made in accordance with a valid arbitration agreement and 
was final and binding according to its governing law and that for this 
purpose it was not necessary for the award to be enforceable under the 
law governing the arbitration. The court reviewed a considerable body 
of academic opinion and case law on the question of whether an 
award has legal effect notwithstanding an order of the court of the 
seat annulling it: 
[T]he answer to the question is not provided by a theory of legal 
philosophy but by a test: whether the Court in considering 
whether to give effect to an award can (in particular and 
identifiable circumstances) treat it as having legal effect 
notwithstanding a later order of a court annulling the award. In 
applying this test it would be both unsatisfactory and contrary to 
principle if the Court were bound to recognise a decision of a 
foreign court which offended against basic principles of honesty, 
natural justice and domestic concepts of public policy.7 
Accordingly, the existence of the Russian Set-aside Decisions did not 
automatically extinguish the Awards. It was open to Yukos Capital to 
argue that the Russian Set-aside Decisions ought to be disregarded. 
The question of whether the Awards in the present case were in fact 
enforceable was left for later determination.8 
On the Interest Preliminary Issue there were two distinct sub-
issues considered by the High Court: 
                                                                                                                                     
6. Latin maxim meaning “nothing comes out of nothing.” 
7. [2014] EWHC 2188 (Comm), supra note 5. 
8. Following a trial determining, among other things, that Yukos Capital’s allegations 
that the Russian Court Decisions should not be recognized, and (to the extent permissible) 
Rosneft’s ‘public policy’ defense was based on an allegation of tax fraud. 
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1. the claim for interest under Article 395 of the Russian Civil 
Code; and 
2. the claim for interest in English law under section 35A of the 
1981 Act. 
Having examined expert evidence adduced by the parties, the High 
Court held that interest cannot be recovered as a matter of Russian 
law. In respect of English law, Rosneft argued that the parties had 
excluded the ability of the English Court to award interest by having 
agreed that all disputes between them, including a dispute as to any 
interest, should be resolved by an arbitral tribunal in Russia, and that 
such tribunal had no power to award interest under Section 35A of the 
1981 Act. 
The High Court held that the enforcement action was a claim to 
enforce a debt and therefore interest could be claimed as part of that 
action even though it was not included in the underlying award. 
Although the circumstances in which the arbitrators declined to grant 
an award of interest might be relevant to the exercise of the English 
Court’s discretion to award interest, the court held there was no 
absolute bar to an award of interest in respect of the late payment of a 
foreign award under Section 35A of the 1981 Act. Whether the 
interest should be awarded as a matter of discretion in these particular 
circumstances was also left for later determination. 
The question of whether a party must object to jurisdiction (and 
other preliminary issues or decisions) at certain stages of the arbitral 
process has been the subject of debate in a number of cases 
worldwide. In the English case Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Co. v. 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan,9 Dallah was a 
Saudi Arabian company which provided services for pilgrims 
travelling to the Holy Places in Saudi Arabia. In July 1995, Dallah 
signed a memorandum of understanding (“MoU”) with the 
Government of Pakistan in relation to the construction of certain 
housing for Pakistani pilgrims. In September 1996, Dallah entered 
into a contract (“Contract”) with the Awami Hajj Trust (“Trust”), a 
body which had been established by an Ordinance promulgated by the 
President of Pakistan. The Contract contained an arbitration 
agreement, under which all disputes were to be referred to 
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) arbitration in Paris. 
                                                                                                                                     
         9.  Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
Government of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763, 763 (Eng.).  
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The Government was not a signatory to the Contract, although 
the Contract made reference to a guarantee to be provided by the 
Government and included a provision by which the Trust could assign 
its rights and obligations to the Government without the permission of 
Dallah. The housing project never came to fruition and, following a 
change of government in Pakistan, the Trust ceased to exist as a legal 
entity. In May 1998, Dallah commenced ICC arbitration proceedings 
against the government. In the arbitration, Dallah convinced the 
arbitral tribunal—composed of three well-known arbitrators—that the 
tribunal had jurisdiction over the government. The arbitral tribunal 
issued three awards (successively on jurisdiction, applicable law, and 
the merits) and awarded Dallah approximately US$20 million in 
damages and legal costs. Dallah then endeavored to enforce the final 
award in the United Kingdom. The government opposed enforcement 
before the UK courts and commenced annulment proceedings against 
all three awards before the Paris Court of Appeal. 
The UK Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether 
the government, which was not a signatory to the Contract, should be 
considered a party to the arbitration agreement (as an ICC tribunal 
sitting in Paris had found), or whether enforcement of the tribunal’s 
award could be refused under Article V(1)(a) of the New York 
Convention because a proper application of French law led to the 
conclusion that the Government was not a party to the arbitration 
agreement. The UK Supreme Court held that, on a proper 
interpretation of the New York Convention, whenever a party resists 
enforcement under Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention (i.e., 
by claiming that the arbitration agreement was invalid), the Court is 
bound to “revisit the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction.” The 
Supreme Court also endorsed the position of the government that the 
reviewing court “may have regard to the reasoning and findings of the 
alleged arbitral tribunal, if they are helpful, but it is neither bound nor 
restricted by them.” 
The UK Supreme Court, in applying French law, purported to 
follow the reasoning of the French Court of Cassation in the well-
known Dalico case to the extent that it analyzed the common 
intention of the parties.10 It concluded that “there was no material 
sufficient to justify the tribunal’s conclusion,” that the Government 
                                                                                                                                     
        10. Cour de Cassation [Cass.], First Civil Chamber, Municipalité de Khoms El 
Mergeb v. Dalico, Dec. 20, 1993, JDI 1994, 432, note E. Gaillard. 
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was a party to the arbitration agreement, and therefore refused to 
enforce the award in the United Kingdom. In contrast, in 2011, 
in Gouvernement du Pakistan—Ministère des Affaires Religieuses v. 
Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company,11 the Paris Court 
of Appeal rejected an application by the Government of Pakistan to 
set aside three ICC awards delivered in Paris, holding that the arbitral 
tribunal was correct in finding it had jurisdiction over the government 
despite it not being a signatory to the arbitration agreement 
The Paris Court of Appeal followed the Dalico doctrine 
whereby: 
1. an international arbitration agreement is not governed by any 
national law but by French “material rules” (règles 
matérielles) of international arbitration;12 and 
2. the issue of whether a party is bound by an arbitration clause 
has to be solved by a factual enquiry, i.e. the court must assess 
whether the parties intended to go to arbitration. 
Following Dalico, the Paris Court retraced in detail the successive 
steps of the project in order to analyze the dealings between the 
parties. 
The Paris Court noted that during the entire period prior to the 
conclusion of the Contract, the Government was Dallah’s sole 
counterpart/negotiating partner, in particular, that the government 
negotiated the Contract directly, although the signatory, from a legal 
standpoint, was the Trust. The Paris Court then emphasized that the 
government was also involved during the performance of the 
Contract, as evidenced, in particular, by the direct involvement of two 
employees of the government in the organization of savings plans and 
advertising campaigns related to the project. Finally, the Court 
stressed that the government directly handled the termination of the 
Contract. 
In light of the above, the Paris Court of Appeal concluded that: 
[The government] behaved as if the Contract was its own; . . . 
this involvement of [the government], in the absence of evidence 
that the Trust took any actions, as well as [the 
government’s] behaviour during the pre-contractual negotiations, 
                                                                                                                                     
        11. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Gouvernement du Pakistane – 
Ministère des Affaires Religieuses v. Societe Dallah Real Estate Tourism and Holding 
Company, civ., Feb. 17, 2011, 09/28533. 
       12. Rules applied by a French court without a conflict of laws analysis. 
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confirm that the creation of the Trust was purely formal and 
that [the government] was in fact the true Pakistani party in the 
course of the economic transaction. 
The Court thus rejected the Government’s request.13 Both the UK and 
French courts concluded that they had authority to conduct a full 
review of the arbitrators’ decision on jurisdiction. With regards to 
French law, this decision is consistent with well-established case law. 
To some extent the position in Asia is still being developed as 
courts there grapple with establishing jurisprudence that suit their 
policies and principles. As far as enforcement in Asia is concerned 
there are a few common relevant principles that apply: 
1. The primary aim of the court is to facilitate the arbitral process 
and to assist with enforcement of arbitral awards. 
2. Under most arbitration laws, the court should interfere in the 
arbitration of the dispute only as expressly provided for in the 
law. 
3. Subject to the observance of the safeguards that are necessary 
in the public interest, the parties to a dispute should be free to 
agree on how their dispute should be resolved. 
The grounds that arise most often are: 
1. not having been given notice of the arbitral proceedings, 
2. inability to present one’s case, or 
3. that the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure 
was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement. 
On applications to set aside or to refuse enforcement on any of those 
grounds, the court is concerned with the structural integrity of the 
arbitration proceedings. In this regard, the conduct complained of 
“must be serious, even egregious,” before the court would find that 
there was an error sufficiently serious so as to have undermined due 
process.14 Thus, it is fair to say that in drawing on recent case law on 
the issue of enforcement a number of principles emerge (particularly 
from the courts in Hong Kong): 
                                                                                                                                     
13. Furthermore, the court ordered the Government to pay the full amount of legal fees 
claimed by Dallah, (€100,000) under Article 700 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
14. Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd. v. Pacific China Holdings Ltd. [2012] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 1 
(CA). 
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1. The courts are prepared to enforce awards except where 
complaints of substance can be made good. 
2 The party opposing enforcement has to show a real risk of 
prejudice and that its rights are shown to have been violated in a 
material way.15 
3. Failure to make prompt objection to the tribunal or the 
supervisory court may constitute estoppel or want of bona fide.16 
4. In considering whether or not to refuse the enforcement of the 
award, the court does not look into the merits or at the underlying 
transaction.17 
5. Even if sufficient grounds are made out either to refuse 
enforcement or to set aside an arbitral award, the court has a 
residual discretion and may nevertheless enforce the award 
despite the proven existence of a valid ground.18 
6. In addition, the Court of Final Appeal (HK) has clearly 
recognized that parties to the arbitration have a duty of good 
faith, or to act bona fide.19 
In Malaysia, in Agrovenus LLP v. Pacific Inter-Link,20 the award 
debtor sought to resist enforcement of the award on the ground that 
the tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the dispute between the parties 
(s.39 of Arbitration Act 2005 (Malaysia)). The opposing party argued 
that as the award debtor had not raised any objection to the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction throughout the arbitration proceedings, the award debtor 
was now estopped from raising such objections to the court. At first 
instance, the judge held that it had the ability to evaluate the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction despite the jurisdictional issue having not been raised at 
an earlier time (in line with English decision of Dallah). The Court of 
Appeal, overturned the High Court’s decision, holding that the award 
debtor was effectively estopped from challenging the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction after the award had already been rendered, citing Rustall 
Trading Ltd v. Gill & Duffus SA: 
                                                                                                                                     
15. Id. 
16. Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek Engineering Co. Ltd. [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 
111 (CFA).  
17. Xiamen Xingjingdi Group Ltd. v. Eton Properties Ltd. [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 353 
(CA). 
18. Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek Engineering Co. Ltd. [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 
111, supra note 16, at 136A-B.  
19. Id. at 1201, 137B. 
20. [2014] 4 C.L.J. 525. 
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 . . . a party to an arbitration must act promptly if he considered 
that there were grounds on which he could challenge the 
effectiveness of the proceedings; if he failed to do so and 
continued to take party in the proceedings, he would be 
precluded from making a challenge at a later date.21 
This position is to be contrasted with the position in Singapore in a 
number of respects. Astro Nusantara v. PT Ayunda22 concerns the 
arbitration proceedings arising out of a joint venture for the provision 
of multimedia services in Indonesia. 
The dispute between the parties arose out of a joint venture 
agreement called the Subscription and Shareholders’ Agreement 
(“SSA”), dated March 11, 2005, entered into between companies 
belonging to an Indonesian conglomerate (“Lippo Group”) on the one 
hand and companies within a Malaysian media group (“Astro 
Group”) on the other for the provision of multimedia and television 
services in Indonesia. The joint venture vehicle was the third 
defendant in these proceedings (“Direct Vision”). The Lippo Group’s 
interest in the joint venture was held by the first defendant in these 
proceedings, Ayunda, whose obligations to the Astro Group under the 
joint venture were guaranteed by First Media, an Indonesian company 
with its shares listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. On the other 
hand, the Astro Group’s interest in the joint venture was held by the 
third and fourth applicants, with the fifth applicant guaranteeing their 
obligations. The original parties to the SSA were the third to fifth 
applicants on the side of the Astro Group, and Ayunda, First Media 
and Direct Vision (collectively referred to as “Lippo”) on the side of 
the Lippo Group. Subsequently, pursuant to a novation agreement, the 
first and second applicants took the place of the third and fourth 
applicants in the joint venture. The Additional Parties were, however, 
never made parties to the SSA. 
Clause 18.5 of the SSA provided that the agreement shall be 
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the 
Republic of Singapore. The SSA contained a number of conditions 
precedent upon which the parties’ respective obligations thereunder 
were predicated. It was agreed that the parties would have until July 
                                                                                                                                     
21. [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 228. 
22. Astro Nusantara Int’l BV and Others v. PT Ayunda Prima Mitra and Others [2013] 1 
SLR 636 (first instance); PT First Media TBK (formerly known as PT Broadband Multimedia 
TBK) v. Astro Nusantara Int’l BV and Others [2014] 1 SLR 372 (Court of Appeal).  
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2006 to fulfil those conditions precedent. In the meantime, funds and 
services were provided by the Additional Parties to Direct Vision to 
build up the latter’s business from about December 2005. 
As a matter of fact, the conditions precedent were not fulfilled. 
By about mid-August 2007, it became clear to the parties that the 
joint venture would not close. Nevertheless, the Additional Parties 
continued to provide funds and services to Direct Vision while the 
parties were exploring exit options. A dispute then arose between 
Lippo and Astro. Lippo contended that the Additional Parties had, 
orally or by conduct, agreed to continue to provide funds and services 
to Direct Vision, but Astro was not willing to do so.  
In October 2008, the Additional Parties stopped further 
provision of funds and services to Direct Vision. In the meantime, in 
September 2009, Ayunda commenced proceedings in the Indonesian 
court against, inter alia, the Additional Parties (“Indonesian 
Proceedings"). On the basis that the commencement of the Indonesian 
Proceedings amounted to a breach of the arbitration agreement 
contained in the SSA, Astro commenced arbitration at the Singapore 
International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) by a notice of arbitration 
dated October 6, 2008 against Lippo (“the Arbitration”). 
In the notice of arbitration, Astro sought, inter alia, the 
following relief against Lippo: 
1. an anti-suit injunction against Ayunda in respect of the 
Indonesian Proceedings; 
2. declarations that the SSA was the parties’ only joint venture 
agreement which had lapsed and there was no continuing 
obligation on the part of Astro to continue to provide funds and 
services to Direct Vision; and 
3. payment of various sums by way of restitution and/or quantum 
meruit. 
In view of the fact that the Additional Parties were not parties to the 
SSA, Astro stated in the notice of arbitration that the Additional 
Parties had consented to being added as parties to the Arbitration, and 
made an application pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the 2007 SIAC Rules 
to join the Additional Parties as parties to the Arbitration (“Joinder 
Application”). 
Rule 24(b), under the heading of “Additional Powers of the 
Tribunal,” states as follows: 
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In addition and not in derogation of the powers conferred by any 
applicable law of the arbitration, the Tribunal shall have the 
power to: 
 . . .  
b. allow other parties to be joined in the arbitration with 
their express consent, and make a single final award 
determining all disputes among the parties to the 
arbitration. 
The Joinder Application was contested by Lippo. On May 7, 2009, 
the Tribunal rendered an award (“Award on Preliminary Issues”), 
holding that: 
1. on the true construction of Rule 24(b), it had power to join the 
Additional Parties as parties to the Arbitration as long as they 
consented to being joined; and 
2. the power to join the Additional Parties as parties to the 
Arbitration should be exercised. 
Lippo did not challenge the Tribunal’s preliminary award on 
jurisdiction before the Singapore Courts within the thirty-day time 
limit under Article 16(3) of the Model Law. Instead, it continued to 
participate in the arbitration, but noted its continued objection to the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Although relief was granted to all eight 
applicants under the Awards, the principal monetary relief awarded 
by the Tribunal was in favor of the Astro Joinder Parties (the sixth to 
eighth applicants). Between May 7, 2009 and August 3, 2010, the 
Tribunal issued four further awards in Astro’s favor in excess of 
US$130 million.23 
Astro sought enforcement of the Awards in various jurisdictions, 
including Singapore, Hong Kong, England, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 
Lippo did not resist proceedings for the recognition and enforcement 
of the Awards in England or Malaysia, because Lippo had no assets in 
those jurisdictions on which execution of the judgments giving effect 
to the Awards could be levied. For the same reason, Lippo did not 
originally take steps to resist proceedings for the recognition and 
enforcement of the Awards in Hong Kong, but subsequently adopted 
a different stance when it transpired that there were assets of Lippo to 
be found here (disputed by Lippo). Lippo did take active steps to 
                                                                                                                                     
23. The arbitral tribunal constituted of very eminent and experienced practitioners: Sir 
Gordon Langley, Sir Simon Tuckey, and Stewart C Boyd CBE QC. 
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resist proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of the Awards 
in Indonesia on various grounds. 
The focus of the parties’ arguments before the Hong Kong and 
Singapore courts related to the enforcement of the Awards by the 
Additional Parties against First Media. In Hong Kong, the 
enforcement had occurred without any significant challenge grounded 
on the joinder issue. In Singapore, the seat of the arbitration, the 
joinder issue was raised not in a setting aside application but in 
defense of an enforcement application. 
In view of the fact that the seat of the Arbitration was in 
Singapore, the Awards were regarded as “domestic international 
awards” in so far as proceedings for their recognition and 
enforcement in Singapore were concerned. The statutory regime 
governing the enforcement of a domestic international award in 
Singapore is Section 19 of the International Arbitration Act (“IAA”), 
which states, “An award on an arbitration agreement may, by leave of 
the High Court or a Judge thereof, be enforced in the same manner as 
a judgment or an order to the same effect and, where leave is so 
given, judgment may be entered in terms of the award.”24 
The following provisions of the 1985 Model Law are also relevant for 
the purposes of properly understanding the decision: 
(1) Article 16(3): “The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea 
referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article [i.e., a plea that the 
arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction] either as a 
preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral 
tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, 
any party may request, within thirty days after having received 
notice of that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the 
matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal; while such a 
request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral 
proceedings and make an award.” 
(2) Article 34(1): “Recourse to a court against an arbitral award 
may be made only by an application for setting aside in 
accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article.” 
(3) Article 34(2): “An arbitral award may be set aside by the 
court specified in article 6 only if (a) the party making the 
application furnishes proof that: (i) . . . the said agreement is not 
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or … 
                                                                                                                                     
24. Cap 143A, 2002 Rev. Ed. 
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(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission 
to arbitration . . . .” 
(4) Article 34(3): “An application for setting aside may not be 
made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the 
party making that application had received the award . . . .” 
(5) Article 36(1): “Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral 
award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, may be 
refused only: (a) at the request of the party against whom it is 
invoked, if that party furnishes to the competent court where 
recognition or enforcement is sought proof that: (i) . . . the said 
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have 
subjected it or . . . (iii) the award deals with a dispute not 
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission 
to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the 
scope of the submission to arbitration . . . .” 
The Lippo companies did not apply to set aside the Awards in 
Singapore based on the grounds of Article 34(1) ML within the time 
limit. Astro subsequently sought to enforce the Awards in Singapore 
by the High Court. In response, Lippo challenged the enforcement 
orders on the jurisdictional ground that there was no agreement to 
arbitrate between the Lippo and the Astro Joinder Parties, who were 
not parties to the SSA. 
The Singapore High Court, in dismissing the challenge held that 
there was no statutory basis to invoke lack of jurisdiction as a ground 
to resist or refuse enforcement of a Singapore Award. Further, the 
Court held that a domestic international award is recognized as final 
and binding, unless, and exclusively so, it is set aside under the 
grounds stipulated under the IAA. At first instance in the High Court 
of Singapore, the judge interpreted Article 16(3) of the Model Law as 
the “exclusive route” through which a preliminary decision on 
jurisdiction can be challenged. Once the time limit for bringing a 
challenge under Article 16(3) has elapsed without any application 
having been made, the preliminary ruling on jurisdiction becomes 
final and cannot be challenged subsequently, whether by way of a 
setting-aside application or at the enforcement stage. As the Lippo 
parties did not challenge the Award on Preliminary Issues under 
Article 16(3) of the Model Law, the judge held that it had lost its sole 
and exclusive opportunity to raise its jurisdictional objection before 
the Singapore courts. It was therefore no longer open to a Singapore 
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court to revisit the jurisdictional objection. The Matter then proceeded 
to an appeal to the Court of Appeal, where the Court of Appeal was 
asked to deal with the question of whether Lippo was estopped from 
pursuing a passive remedy. 
While the validity of the Awards could no longer be challenged 
by First Media before the Singapore court, being the supervisory 
court of the arbitration, enforcement of the Awards by the Additional 
Parties against First Media was refused by the Singapore Court of 
Appeal by a judgment of that court rendered on October 31, 2013, on 
the ground that there was no valid arbitration agreement between the 
Additional Parties and First Media and the Tribunal had no 
jurisdiction to make the Awards in favor of the Additional Parties 
against First Media. On appeal, the Singapore Court of Appeal, 
examined the development of the law of arbitration in Singapore since 
the first enactment of its arbitration legislation, the subsequent 
adoption of the Model Law and the New York Convention, as well as 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working 
Group’s travaux preparatoires in relation to the Model Law. 
It also referred to pronouncements by other courts as to the 
implications of the New York Convention on whether and how the 
pursuit of active remedies in the seat of arbitration might be relevant 
to enforcement proceedings. In particular, the court referred to the 
decision of the UK Supreme Court in Dallah. In Dallah, Lord Mance 
noted that Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention accorded 
some deference and importance to the seat of arbitration, but went on 
to say the following, with which the Singapore Court of Appeal 
agreed: 
But article V(1)(a) and section 103(2)(b) [the section in the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 (c 23) which gives effect to the 
New York Convention] are framed as free-standing and categoric 
alternative grounds to article V(1)(e) of the Convention and 
section 103(2)(f) for resisting recognition or enforcement. 
Neither article V(1)(a) nor section 103(2)(b) hints at any 
restriction on the nature of the exercise open, either to the person 
resisting enforcement or to the court asked to enforce an award, 
when the validity (sc existence) of the supposed arbitration 
agreement is in issue. The onus may be on the person resisting 
recognition or enforcement, but the language enables such person 
to do so by proving (or furnishing proof) of the non-existence of 
any arbitration agreement. This language points strongly to 
ordinary judicial determination of that issue. Nor do article VI 
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and section 103(5) contain any suggestion that a person resisting 
recognition or enforcement in one country has any obligation to 
seek to set aside the award in the other country where it was 
made.25 
A close examination of the development of and difference in the 
Model Law and New York Convention allows for an argument said to 
be established by the “choice of remedies” principle. The Singapore 
Court of Appeal said: 
The drafters of the Model Law, in aligning the Model Law with 
the New York Convention, were plainly desirous of continuing 
this trend of de-emphasising the importance of the seat of 
arbitration. However, there was and is one significant difference 
between the New York Convention and the Model Law. Unlike 
the New York Convention which only dealt with enforcement of 
awards, the Model Law also dealt with the setting aside of 
awards made in the seat of arbitration by the courts of that seat. 
This other avenue to challenge domestic awards resulted in the 
possibility that the enforcement of awards originating from 
within the jurisdiction of the supervisory court would be treated 
differently from that of foreign awards. This is where ‘choice of 
remedies’ becomes significant and forms the crux of this 
dispute.26 
Contrary to the view of the judge at first instance, the Court 
interpreted Section 19 of the IAA as providing the Singapore Court 
with an inherent power to refuse the enforcement of domestic 
international awards rendered in Singapore. 
Drawing on earlier iterations of the wording of Section 19 in 
enactments prior to the IAA (which had in turn come from the 1950 
Arbitration Act) and English case law, the court determined that 
historically a “choice of remedies” was enshrined within Singapore 
law. This provided two options for a party against whom an award 
was rendered: 
1. an “active remedy” of setting aside the award; or 
2. a “passive remedy” of resisting enforcement by the 
counterparty, which was available even where no active 
challenge had been made. 
                                                                                                                                     
25. PT First Media TBK v. Astro Nusantara International BV & Ors SGCA 57, at 28 
(2013). 
26. Id. at 64. 
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The Court did not consider this position had been altered by the 
introduction of the Model Law through the IAA. Therefore, it was 
held that “Parliament, in receiving the Model Law into Singapore, 
intended to retain for the courts the power to refuse enforcement of 
domestic international awards under s 19, even if the award could 
have been but was not attacked by an active remedy.”27 The 
Singapore Court of Appeal examined and then applied the following 
principles in reaching its decision: 
(1) The enforcement of domestic international awards is 
governed by s.19 of the IAA, the construction of which must be 
consonant with the underlying philosophy of the Model Law. 
(2) The overarching scheme of the Model Law is to de-
emphasize the importance of the seat of the arbitration and 
facilitate the uniform treatment of international arbitration 
awards. 
(3) The principle of “choice of remedies,” under which passive 
remedies will still be available to the award debtor who did not 
utilize his active remedies, is fundamental to the design of the 
Model Law. In this connection, 
(i) “active remedies” means taking positive steps to 
invalidate an arbitral award such as by an application to 
challenge a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction under article 
16(3) of the Model Law or to set aside an award on the 
grounds set out in article 34(1) of the Model Law, 
(ii) “passive remedies” means resisting the recognition or 
enforcement of an award in the jurisdiction where and 
when the award is sought to be enforced under article 36 of 
the Model Law; and 
(iii) “choice of remedies” means the award debtor may 
resist enforcement of an award by “passive” means even 
though it had not pursued “active” remedies to challenge 
the preliminary ruling or set aside the award. 
(4) It follows that the best way to give effect to the philosophy of 
the Model Law would be to recognize that the same grounds for 
resisting enforcement under Article 36(1) of the Model Law will 
be equally available under s 19 of the IAA. 
(5) Article 16(3) of the Model Law is neither an exception to the 
principle of “choice of remedies,” nor a “one-shot remedy” 
                                                                                                                                     
 27. Id. at 47. 
830 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:3 
(meaning that a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction must be 
challenged within the prescribed thirty-day time limit, failing 
which the party objecting to the ruling will be deprived of any 
other chance to subsequently raise the same jurisdictional ground 
in setting aside or enforcement proceedings, and if the 
preliminary ruling is challenged but not set aside by the 
supervisory court, the party objecting to jurisdiction cannot raise 
the same grounds in any subsequent application to set aside the 
award before the supervisory court, or to resist enforcement of 
the award before the enforcement court, irrespective of whether 
the latter is in the same jurisdiction as the supervisory court or 
elsewhere). 
(6) As such, pursuant to s 19 of the IAA, First Media may apply 
to set aside the Singapore Enforcement Orders under any of the 
grounds which are found in article 36(1) of the Model Law, even 
though it did not pursue “active remedies” to challenge the 
Award on Preliminary Issues under Article 16(3) of the Model 
Law or set aside the Awards under Article 34(1) of the Model 
Law. 
(7) It is a matter to be determined by Singapore law whether the 
Additional Parties were properly joined to the Arbitration so as to 
establish an arbitration agreement with First Media. 
(8) Upon the true construction of Rule 24(b), it does not confer 
on the Tribunal the power to join third parties who are not parties 
to the arbitration agreement (i.e., the SSA in the present case) 
into the Arbitration. 
(9) Accordingly, the Tribunal’s exercise of its power under Rule 
24(b) to join the Additional Parties to the Arbitration was 
improper with the corollary that no express agreement to arbitrate 
existed between the Additional Parties and First Media. 
(10) In addition, First Media did not waive its rights or conduct 
itself in such a way that it was estopped from raising the joinder 
objection. 
(11) First Media is entitled to resist the enforcement of the 
Awards pursuant to s 19 of the IAA. 
(12) Nevertheless, partial enforcement of the Awards in favor of 
the first to fifth applicants (whom First Media did not dispute 
were proper parties to the SSA and the Arbitration) was viable, 
and leave to enforce the Awards, to the extent of those parts 
which are exclusively directed at the first to fifth applicants, was 
granted. 
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Thus, the court rejected the submission that Article 16(3) of the 
Model law was a mandatory route that must be followed. The Court 
of Appeal held that there was no evidence that the drafters intended to 
override the co-existence of active and passive remedies. Article 
16(3) of the Model Law constituted “neither an exception to the 
‘choice of remedies’ policy of the Model Law, nor a ‘one-shot 
remedy.’” Consequently, leave was granted to appeal on the 
substantive point of joinder. On the joinder issue, therefore, the court 
held that since there was no agreement to arbitrate between Lippo and 
the Astro Joinder Parties, the Tribunal had erred in joining the Astro 
Joinder Parties, and the Awards could not be enforced against Lippo 
by those parties. 
This is consistent with the position in England. In Dallah, Lord 
Collins of Mapesbury stated: 
[c]onsequently, in an international commercial arbitration a party 
which objects to the jurisdiction of the tribunal has two options. 
It can challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction in the courts of the 
arbitral seat; and it can resist enforcement in the court before 
which the award is brought for recognition and enforcement. 
These two options are not mutually exclusive, although in some 
cases a determination by the court of the seat may give rise to an 
issue estoppel or other preclusive effect in the court in which 
enforcement is sought. The fact that jurisdiction can no longer be 
challenged in the courts of the seat does not preclude 
consideration of the tribunal’s jurisdiction by the enforcing 
courts.28 
It was recognized by the Court of Appeal that not overruling the 
judge’s decision at first instance would have the unwanted effect of 
constraining party autonomy and compelling parties in international 
arbitrations seated in Singapore to raise active challenges with the 
courts. For this reason, when reaching its decision, the Court of 
Appeal was cognizant of the “practical ramifications” and “potentially 
far-reaching implications on the practice and flourishing of arbitration 
in Singapore.”29 
Thus, through its purposive interpretation of the IAA, the Court 
of Appeal has confirmed that a “choice of remedies” for domestic 
international awards rendered in Singapore has been retained in the 
                                                                                                                                     
28. Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of 
Pakistan 1 AC 763 (2010), at 98.  
29. Id. at 90. 
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IAA, bringing the position in Singapore into line with the Model Law 
as well as other key arbitration jurisdictions, including its regional 
competitor, Hong Kong. Accordingly, parties involved in 
international arbitrations seated in Singapore will be afforded the 
freedom to choose whether to make an active challenge to an award 
(which may have its own advantages) or wait until the award is 
sought to be enforced in Singapore, depending on tactical 
considerations, including cost, efficiency, and timing. 
However, before the enforcement proceedings in Singapore took 
place, the matter was also in the courts for enforcement proceedings 
in Hong Kong in Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT First 
Media.30 In 2010, the Hong Kong High Court on application from 
Astro, granted leave to Astro to enforce the awards as judgments and 
directed First Media (Lippo) to apply, if it so chose to do, to set aside 
the orders of the Court within fourteen days of service. No application 
was made to set aside the Hong Kong orders and, therefore, judgment 
was entered in Hong Kong against First Media. Further, no 
application having been made by First Media, in July 2011, Astro 
obtained a garnishee order to attach a debt due to First Media from 
one of its majority shareholders. First Media then made two 
applications to the High Court of Hong Kong seeking: 
1. An extension of time to set aside two court orders made by the 
court in September 2010 granting leave to Astro to enforce five 
arbitration awards against First Media. 
2. To set aside these court orders. 
In those applications, the Court was required to consider whether 
valid grounds existed for granting an extension of time to apply to set 
aside the court orders fourteen months after the expiry of the 
prescribed period. 
Astro argued on five substantive grounds: 
(1) The Awards, being valid and binding and not having been set 
aside, have been entered as judgments in Hong Kong. There was 
no machinery to permit any challenge of such judgments, 
whether under s 44 of the Arbitration Ordinance, Cap 341 
(“Ordinance”) or otherwise, except by way of an appeal to the 
Court of Appeal. 
                                                                                                                                     
30.  Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT First Media, HCCT 45/2010. 
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(2) There were no valid grounds to extend the time to apply to set 
aside the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment fourteen 
months after the period prescribed by the Orders for making such 
application has expired. 
(3) Further, there was no valid basis under Hong Kong law at the 
enforcement stage for First Media to challenge the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal to make the Awards when it lost its challenge in a 
ruling on a preliminary issue by the Tribunal and then 
deliberately decided not to challenge that ruling in court but 
chose to defend the claims on the merits. First Media’s conduct is 
said to be not consonant with the principle of good faith, or 
amount to an implied waiver or give rise to an estoppel. 
(4) In any event, the Tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction was 
correct, and the Hong Kong court was not bound by the decision 
of another enforcing court, namely, the Singapore Court of 
Appeal. 
(5) Further, and in any event, the Tribunal made a further finding 
in the Interim Final Award, namely, that First Media in the 
course of defending the merits had, by signing the Memorandum 
of Issues with its particular wording and without reservation, 
signed a further agreement for the arbitration of the issues 
identified in the memorandum. This, it was said, amounted to a 
binding submission to arbitration of those issues. The Interim 
Final Award has not been challenged or set aside and remained 
valid and binding. The reasoning of the Tribunal on this further 
submission was unimpeachable, and was not addressed by the 
Singapore Courts in the enforcement proceedings in that 
jurisdiction. 
The Court held that there was no basis for accepting a rigid rule 
which would preclude an enforcement order from challenge as soon 
as judgment is entered to give effect to the arbitration award. Section 
44(1) of the Ordinance provides that enforcement of a Convention 
award shall not be refused except in the cases mentioned in that 
section. Section 44(2) of the Ordinance goes to state (inter alia) as 
follows: 
Enforcement of a Convention award may be refused if the person 
against whom it is invoked proves – 
(b) that the arbitration agreement was not valid to which 
the parties subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, 
under the law of the country where the award was made; or 
 . . .  
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(d) subject to subsection(4), that the award deals with a 
difference not contemplated by or not falling within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration or contains decision 
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration. 
In addition, s.44(3) of the Ordinance, states, relevantly, 
[e]nforcement of a Convention award may also be refused if the 
award is in respect of a matter which is not capable of settlement 
by arbitration, or if it would be contrary to public policy to 
enforce the award. 
In considering ground 3 put forward by the Astro parties, the Court 
said that the following basic principles should be borne in mind: 
(1) s.44 of the Ordinance represents the statutory enactment of 
article V of the New York Convention. 
(2) The Hong Kong courts approach Convention awards with a 
pro-enforcement bias: see Werner A Bock KG v The N’s Co Ltd 
[1978] HKLR 281 at 285 per Huggins JA; China Nanhai Oil 
Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings 
Co Ltd [1995] 2 HKLR 215 at 226 per Kaplan J; Hebei Import & 
Export Corp. v Polyteck Engineering Co. Ltd. (1999) 2 HKCFAR 
111 at 136A-B per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ; Societe Nationale 
D’Operations Petrolieres de la Cote d’Ivoire-Holding v Keen 
Lloyd Resources Ltd [2004] 3 HKC 452, at paragraph 14 per 
Burrell J. 
(3) Enforcement of a Convention award is mandatory unless a 
case under s.44(2) or (3) of the Ordinance is made out, in which 
case the court has a discretion to permit or refuse enforcement. 
(4) The fact that an arbitral award has been refused enforcement 
by a court in another jurisdiction, even one whose law governs 
the arbitration agreement or the procedures of the arbitration 
(sometimes referred to as the curial law), is not a ground for 
resisting enforcement of the arbitral award in Hong Kong under 
the New York Convention, because different jurisdictions have 
different rules, laws and regulations governing enforcement of 
arbitral awards.31 In principle, this should be the position even 
where the court in that other jurisdiction also applies the New 
York Convention in denying enforcement of the arbitral award, 
because the Hong Kong court applies s.44 of the Ordinance as a 
                                                                                                                                     
31. Societe Nationale D’Operations Petrolieres de la Cote d’Ivoire-Holding v. Keen 
Lloyd Resources Ltd., at para. 14 per Burrell J. 
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piece of domestic legislation, although it would obviously be 
desirable for different jurisdictions applying the New York 
Convention to do so in a consistent manner. 
(5) Whether a ground has been made out for refusing to enforce a 
Convention award under s.44(2) and (3) of the Ordinance is a 
matter governed by Hong Kong law and to be determined by the 
Hong Kong court. In Hebei Import & Export Corp. v Polyteck 
Engineering Co. Ltd., supra, Sir Anthony Mason NPJ stated at 
136C-E that the Convention distinguished between proceedings 
to set aside an award in the court of supervisory jurisdiction and 
proceedings in the court of enforcement. Proceedings to set aside 
are governed by the law under which the award was made or the 
law of the place where it was made, while proceedings in the 
court of enforcement are governed by the law of that forum.32 
In Hebei, Sir Anthony Mason went on to say that where enforcement 
of an award is resisted on the ground of “public policy” under s.44(3) 
of the Ordinance, the relevant public policy is that of the jurisdiction 
in which enforcement is sought.33 The court held that this is also the 
position where a party seeks to resist enforcement of an arbitral award 
on one or more of the discretionary grounds under s. 44(2) of the 
Ordinance. In such a case, the Hong Kong court should apply its own 
jurisprudence regarding the exercise of its discretion under that 
section, and approach the matter as one governed by Hong Kong law. 
The court held that First Media should not be permitted to resist 
enforcement of the awards on the principle of good faith, as First 
Media did not challenge the tribunal’s preliminary ruling on 
jurisdiction and instead sought to defend its claims on the merits in 
the arbitration. The court also stated that a Hong Kong court was 
bound by the decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal because it 
was the enforcing court. The Court held that First Media was not 
entitled to an extension and dismissed the setting aside application, 
citing the following reasons: 
1. First Media’s application to set aside the orders for 
enforcement was made fourteen months out of time. 
2. The Court was not prepared to exercise its discretion to extend 
the time for First Media’s application given that the delay was 
substantial and a result of First Media’s tactical decision to not 
                                                                                                                                     
32. Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT First Media, supra note 30, at 73. 
33. 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 111, at 136G-H (2001).  
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resist enforcement in Hong Kong and the awards had not been set 
aside and were valid and binding on First Media itself. 
3. The Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision was final and 
conclusive as to whether the tribunal had jurisdiction to join the 
other parties into the arbitration. 
The court referred to two decisions in support of the proposition that 
the court has a discretion under s.44(2) of the Ordinance to decline to 
refuse enforcement, even if a ground for refusal might otherwise be 
made out, in circumstances where there has been a breach of the good 
faith, or bona fide, principle on the part of the award debtor: China 
Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings 
Co. Ltd. and Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polyteck Engineering 
Co. Ltd.34 
In China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen 
Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co. Ltd.,35 the court held that there was a 
general duty of good faith which was distinct from principles of 
estoppel (and presumably waiver) under domestic or municipal laws. 
Justice Kaplan said in that case in relation to the application of the 
principle of good faith: 
It strikes me as quite unfair for a party to appreciate that there 
might be something wrong with the composition of the tribunal 
yet not make any formal submission whatsoever to the tribunal 
about its own jurisdiction, or to the arbitration commission which 
constituted the tribunal and then to proceed to fight the case on 
the merits and then 2 years after the award attempt to nullify the 
whole proceedings on the grounds that the arbitrators were 
chosen from the wrong CIETAC list. I think there is much force 
in Dr. van den Berg’s point that even if a ground of opposition is 
proved, there is still a residual discretion left in the enforcing 
court to enforce nonetheless. This shows that the grounds of 
opposition are not to be inflexibly applied. The residual 
discretion enables the enforcing court to achieve a just result in 
all the circumstances although I accept that in many cases where 
a ground of opposition is established, the discretion is unlikely to 
be exercised in favour of enforcement. If the enforcing court was 
obliged to refuse enforcement in the event of the establishing of a 
                                                                                                                                     
34. China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co. Ltd. 
[1994] 3 HKC 375; Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polyteck Engineering Co. Ltd. 39383 
[1995] 2 HKLR 215. 
35. China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp.  Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co. 
Ltd., supra note 34. 
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ground of opposition, I believe that it would be far harder to 
import the doctrine of estoppel. But a discretion there is, and I for 
myself are prepared to hold that on a true construction of the 
Convention there is indeed a duty of good faith which in the 
circumstances of this case required the Defendant to bring to the 
notice of the full tribunal or the CIETAC Commission in Beijing 
its objections to the formation of this particular arbitral tribunal. 
Its failure to do so and its obvious policy of keeping this point up 
its sleeve to be pulled out only if the arbitration was lost, is not 
one that I find consistent with the obligation of good faith nor 
with any notions of justice and fair play.36 
The Court of Final Appeal in Hebei, stated in relation to the failure by 
a party to raise an objection but instead continue participating in the 
arbitration as follows: 
The respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of the principle 
that a party to an arbitration who wishes to rely on a non-
compliance with the rules governing an arbitration shall do so 
promptly and shall not proceed with the arbitration as if there had 
been no compliance, keeping the point up his sleeve for later 
use.37 
Hence, First Media’s failure to challenge the tribunal’s preliminary 
ruling on jurisdiction amounted to a breach of the principle of good 
faith. Chow J stated that he had the discretion to refuse enforcement if 
the party’s conduct was found to be in breach of good faith. On good 
faith, the Court stated: 
 . . . it seems clear that what First Media decided to do was to 
defend the claim on the merits in the hope that it would succeed 
before the Tribunal, and keep the jurisdictional point in reserve to 
be deployed in the enforcement court only when it suited its 
interests to do so. The fact that First Media did raise the objection 
with the Tribunal should not, in my view, make any difference 
having regard to its subsequent conduct [during the arbitration] . . 
. . First Media should not be permitted to rely on s.44(2) of the 
Ordinance to resist enforcement of the awards because it has 
acted in breach of the good faith, or bona fide, principle.38 
                                                                                                                                     
36. China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co. Ltd. 
[1995] 2 HKLR 215, at 225. 
37. Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polyteck Engineering Co.  Ltd. [1999] 2 
H.K.C.F.A.R. 111 (C.F.A.), at 137. 
38. Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT First Media, supra note 30, at 44. 
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Although First Media had successfully resisted the enforcement of the 
Awards before the Singapore Court of Appeal, the Singapore court 
was acting in its capacity as the enforcement court and not as 
supervisory court. The Awards have not been set aside. They are still 
valid and created legally binding obligations on First Media to satisfy 
them. 
We come full circle with the distinction between setting aside 
proceedings and enforcement proceedings and the respective powers 
exercisable by each court in each scenario. This distinction has been 
held to be a well-understood and accepted conceptual difference, in 
that, setting-aside proceedings are a means of “recourse against the 
award,” that is, they are proceedings to attack the award itself. If 
successful, the award is annulled and, in many cases, no longer exists. 
The legal and practical consequence is that, generally speaking, the 
award is no longer capable of enforcement anywhere else. It also 
means, generally, that the award no longer binds the parties and fresh 
proceedings may be commenced. 
This is very different from a party merely raising defenses to 
enforcement. A court’s ruling on whether to enforce an award within 
its own jurisdiction is not an attack against the award itself but a 
statement by the court that it will not lend its aid to the enforcement 
of the award in that jurisdiction. The effect of such a ruling is, in 
principle, confined to that jurisdiction alone and it is possible for an 
award to be refused enforcement in one jurisdiction but enforced in 
another. 
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, it is far from clear and the 
debate will continue for some time to come. 
 
